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Ancient-Modern Philosophy: George Berkeley and the Reenchantment of the World

By J. Alexander Rutherford (PhD, Moore Theological College)

Author: J. Alexander Rutherford
Journal Title: Teleioteti Journal for Christian Ministry
Journal Abbreviation: TJCM
Volume: 02
Issue: 01
Date Published: 2024
DOI
: https://doi.org/10.60080/djxi1948
Pages: 01-15

Abstract: Christians from a number of fields have identified Modern philosophy as the cause of serious problems in the contemporary world, especially for the Christian doctrine of God. Modernity in various ways disenchanted the world, but they propose to reenchant it by retrieving early Christian Platonism. In this paper, it is argued that George Berkeley offers an alternative for reenchanting the world, not through the rejection of Modernity but through a Christian Modernity which seizes on the best insights of both ancient and modern philosophy, under the guidance of God’s self-revelation, to present a world infused with the governing activity of the Transcendent God.

Keywords: George Berkeley, Modernity, Platonism, metaphysics, ontology, theology, the doctrine of God.

A consistent refrain in late 20th and early 21st century Christian thought has concerned the “disenchantment” of the Western World; that is, the growth and then dominance of worldviews within which God was either non-existent or irrelevant, within which God has no active part to play in the everyday workings of life and nature. Whether it is political secularism, religion that never goes beyond the Sunday church gathering, or the physical sciences, philosophers and sociologists have observed, and occasionally lamented, the relegation of religion and God to the periphery of Western society and life. One strand of this cord, that of philosophically engaged theologians, has identified modern philosophy as the handmaiden of disenchantment, variably pinning the responsibility on late-medieval Nominalism, the Reformation, Modernist philosophy itself, or a genealogy extending through them all.

Theologian Hans Boersma suggests that Reformation emphasis on Biblicism via nominalist philosophy led to the hyper-fragmentation of the world we live in, within which the transcendent God has no normative presence.1 Adrian Pabst argues that the development of a immanent philosophy of the individual, where the individual substance is not defined as an individual in relation to a hierarchy of being culminating in the relational God himself, has produced fragmentation, a radical split between the sacred and the secular. This has left the knowledge of God in his self-disclosure at the mercy of “uncertain intuition and experience.”2 John Milbank suggests that modern philosophy stands at the root of social theories that have created many problems in the modern world, both “modern absolutism and modern liberalism.”3 He also claims that Modern philosophy presumes a problematic theology where creation is no longer a gift of God and God is no longer mysterious.4 Modern philosophy upholds a natural-supernatural dichotomy and opposes genuine transcendence.5

The “Modernity” underpinning these criticisms is hard to nail down—as Adrian Pabst writes, “there was never any absolute, irreversible break in history that gave rise to a coherent system of ideas and institutions which we commonly call ‘modernity.’”6 For Pabst, the “Modernity” that proves to be the problem is the kernel of philosophical thought that grants ontological ultimacy to the particular and rejects the dependence of the individual on a transcendent reality for its individuality.7 For Boersma, the particularism of nominalism, which supposedly rejected the real universal, is the problem.8 Milbank identifies four pillars of modern philosophy: 1) univocity, where terms have semantic identity as used of the Creator and the Creature; 2) representation, where even God’s knowledge was a representation of particular things—he no longer “knows them truly by achieving them in himself as more than themselves and knowable in their alien finitude as the participability of their infinitely perfect exemplary instance”; 3) possibilism, where reasoning is “sundered from an intrinsic determination by the rationally best,” thereby starting “to become reduced to an arbitrary choice that precedes any necessities endemic to an order of actuality”; 4) and concurrence, where God acts through created causality, which is granted some measure of autonomous space outside divine causation.9

These same Christians have sought to re-enchant the West, to reinfuse social and religious life with God, by retrieving early Christian philosophy, a “sacramental ontology,” as some have called it.10 This has involved serious engagement with Postmodern philosophy, as seen in John Milbank’s Being Reconciled, but it comes with a rejection of the fundamental premises of Western thought for the last several centuries.11 Rejecting these premises is no easy feat, however, for much that is recognised as genuine insights in the last several centuries of philosophy and theology build upon the very premises rejected as theologically problematic. Particularism appears to stand at the head of modern science, as argued by M.B. Foster in the early 20th century; Particularism also seems to be a necessary development of Christian theology, necessary to account for the incarnation, as argued recently by Johannes Zachhuber.12 Univocity and Particularism lay behind much of the development in modern linguistics and the study of language.13 The Reformation emphasis on the Bible—a contingent document—as a necessary and sufficient foundation for a life pleasing to God put the contingency of historical events at the heart of Christian life and doctrine.14 20 and 21st-century developments in our understanding of the Bible and the doctrine of God have built on the foundation particularism and contingency, arguing that the God of the Bible is genuinely relational and temporal—a covenant-making, promise-keeping God willing even to die for his people.15 Proponents of these developments argue that they are not merely the end of a genealogy of Modern ideas, nor parasitic of or corrupted from a brighter more beautiful era of philosophical orthodoxy. No, they argue that amidst the excess and problems produced by Modernity are genuine developments in our understanding of God and his world, developments that are firmly rooted in the Christian tradition. These are developments built upon insights granted by the Holy Spirit to God’s people across time, not privileging any one era as having arrived at the normative paradigm. It is possible that these defenders of Modernity are wrong, but they reveal that rejecting the premises described as “Modern” is no simple thing: to reject them is to reject much of the contemporary world.

One author has sought to retrieve 18th-century philosopher George Berkeley as a guide to this re-enchantment project, suggesting that Berkeley sits comfortably in the “long tradition of Christian Platonism.”16 One interpretation of Berkeley’s most difficult work, Siris, certainly yields such a conclusion, yet his earlier works present a very different vision of reality than Christian Platonism—and Siris can be interpreted in line with these early works.17 However, whether we are talking about George Berkeley as a whole or just his earlier works, he points us to Modernity itself as a tool for reimaging a world infused with the activity of God, a world where it can be said that we live and move and have our being in Him.

In this paper, I want to argue that Berkeley offers a unique response to those who would demonize the particularism and conceptualism of Modern philosophy and theology: Berkeley offers a way to affirm the good in Modernity and the thought that followed it while chastening their arrogance, assuming as they often have that the good can be maintained without the God of the ancient world. By infusing Modernity with the God of the Bible, a God who is immanent without sacrificing his transcendence, Berkeley offers a compelling alternative to theologies which entirely accommodate to the secularised frame of the 21st-century world and to those who seek to revert to a pre-modern paradigm. Consider with me, first, Berkeley as a proponent of Modernity and its 20th and 21st-century heirs, then Berkeley as a child of ancient philosophy, and finally the potential of this ancient-Modern philosophy for revitalising our theology.

I. Berkeley, The Modernist

George Berkeley, Bishop of Cloyne (b. 1685), built an ontology of ideas on a firmly Modern foundation. Particularism, nominalism, concurrence, univocity, and contingency all have their place in Berkeley’s philosophy, yet they do not function to open the door to a merely imminent doctrine of God, they do not invite scepticism, nor do they facilitate a sort of deism. Instead, Berkeley engaged with contemporary philosophy from within contemporary philosophy, arguing against atheism and scepticism alike.

Interacting with John Locke, Berkeley dismissed the reality of an indescribable matter as the foundation of perceptible ideas. Berkeley argued, instead, that only souls and ideas existed. He argued, furthermore, that only particular ideas exist. He dismissed the possibility of abstract ideas, whereby the distinguishing qualities of individuals are separated from that which is common until an idea containing only what is common is attained, such as a “humanity” abstracted from humans. Berkeley responds that he can frame no ideas apart from particular qualities: any idea of a human he produces is always a particular human, with a colour, shape, and size. Berkeley proposes, as did William of Ockham, that universality is not found in such abstract ideas but in names or notions, mental acts, that signify several particulars together, “by virtue whereof,” he wrote, “it is that things, names, or notions, being in their own nature particular, are rendered universal.18 He then appealed to the phenomena of consciousness, that is, experience, primarily to vision and touch. We have no access to matter, only to properties such as size, shape, colour, and texture. However, each of these properties is mind-dependent. In the case of size, a castle appears huge when we are close but terribly tiny from a distance. Similarly, a chair appears the appropriate size for us but, if we could imagine its perception, huge to a beetle. Similarly, a new paint job can change our perception of the shape of an object, smoothing out its rough edges or making a plane disappear. Sight is notoriously prone to manipulation, but touch can also be affected by numerous mental states. If all properties are mind-dependent, and matter is an empty idea, then why not posit that all things which we perceive are completely mind-dependent—are ideas, not matter?

Berkeley was not the first immaterialist, yet here he has overturned materialism within the Modern frame, with appeals to the contingency of bodily perception and particularism. Unlike Plato, Berkeley does not use the contingency of bodily perception to overturn the value of sense experience. Plato argued that the perceptible world only yields opinion and knowledge is found only in the intelligence world of which the perceptible is an image: the contingency of sense perception establishes the primacy the universal and intelligible over the particular and perceptible.19 Berkeley, in contrast, uses the contingency of the senses to establish the ambiguous nature of the data received by the senses, yet he appeals to context (such as the sense of touch complementing the sense of sight) to resolve these ambiguities. He then maintains that sense data is invaluable to knowledge, and in Siris will even argue from sense data to the God who speaks to us through the senses. By rejecting abstract ideas, and consequently, real universals, Berkeley has severed individuals from any transcendent relation that relativises them, that would limit the value of knowing them to their relation to an infinite reality in God; instead, the finite is what matters, to know anything is to know it as individual—to know it as it is perceived, for that is all it is. In, Siris, Berkeley does push us past the individual, but arguably he shows that all knowledge of created things points us to their first and efficient cause, God himself.20 Knowledge again resolves into an individual, though here it is an individual comprehended by the intellect, not the senses.21 Individuals are connected to other individuals, but this is a mental connection that facilitates further knowledge of an individual in the particularity of their configuration, not a relation that sublimates their individuality into something more real, true, or beautiful.

With particularism comes a whole-hearted embrace of contingency. Every particular is in a sense accidental, a unique entity that has no rational explanation outside of the nexus that is their being: each particular being has a unique explanation, so there is no pre-existing ideal that necessitates that specific thing.22 The radical contingency of the created order is underscored by Berkeley’s claim that nothing exists which is not perceived or perceiving: he this declares all things to be contingently grounded in the variance of perception by which he has rejected matter (Philosophical Commentaries, §429). Because perception is mind-dependent, shown by the variable interpretation of visual signs and the discord between visual and tactile perception, perceived things are variously construed by perceivers—a chair may simultaneously be small to me and large to a mite (Dialogues, First Dialogue, pp. 151-154).

Finally, Berkeley does not shy away from accepting univocity and conceptualism, similar to that developed by William of Ockham, which detractors have labelled “nominalism.” As indicated above, Berkeley replaces abstraction and real universals with mental notions: as with Ockham, universality is a mental act whereby various particulars are signified by the same term. He will speak of God’s knowledge as archetypical for human thought, yet the archetype is not a universal, rational principle in relation to contingent sensory experience; instead, it is the normative idea of which finite, sensory perception is the ectype. Because conceptualism achieves universality through the mental act of relating, not ontological identity, univocity loses its bite. To say that God and humanity are both beings, are both predicated of love and goodness, rejects neither qualitative difference nor true similarity. That is, predicating “good” to God and humanity relies on a genuine similarity: the term is univocal, in the same way all conceptualist universals are, connecting like but not identical particulars. However, univocity here rests on apparent similarity, not ontological identity. God’s ideas are always archetypical and norming; human ideas are ectypical and normed. To use the analogy of language, which Berkeley uses frequently, God speaks the discourse that is the created world and eternally holds the right interpretation of this discourse; humans interpret this discourse via perception. God gives, and we receive.

 Berkeley’s particularism, and his appeals to the contingent phenomena of human experience to develop an ontology, put him firmly within Modernity—not to mention his active engagement with the natural sciences of his day. Yet his emphasis on the active presence of God, and his denial of independent, material reality is of a radically different sort: it is premodern or ancient.

II. Berkeley, the Ancient

Berkeley set out in his philosophical writings to commend an alternative to scepticism and atheism, to offer a thoroughgoing case for belief in God. However, he did not primarily do this through apologetic arguments; instead, he commended a vision of reality that was thoroughly suffused with God himself, while maintaining the creator-creature distinction.23 Only later did this vision receive articulation in an explicitly apologetic manner, especially in Alciphron and Siris. In Siris, Berkeley expresses admiration for Plato, and this has led to an interpretation of his philosophy, at least as expressed in Siris, as being firmly Platonic.24 Platonic philosophy is primarily a philosophy of idea, where idea is accounted with real being; in Neo-Platonic philosophy, some space was offered for matter, at the end of a chain of being, but it was opposite of the truly real, of the One, and at the lowest level of being. In 7th-century Christian thought, matter could mostly, if not entirely, be done away with.25 In Maximus the Confessor, matter was part of what characterised certain individuals, but it remained only an idea until it received being through a τροπός (tropos), the granting of mode to the idea in God’s mind. Τροπός is all that distinguishes an idea from a real thing, yet τροπός doesn’t describe matter or a metaphysical alternative, instead, it appears to describe God’s act in creation to grant being to his ideas and to sustain them in existence as substances. Τροπός describes God’s act of making his private ideas public, living and active, perceivable and tangible. Already in Maximus there is a move towards particularism that will be realised in the Modern age, yet the ancient primacy of idea stands out.26 Ideas are not only the objects of thought itself, but in a world that is only ideas, we never escape from minds, let alone from Mind—from God’s active interpretation and sustaining of creation. In the Christian paradigm, Idealism does not resolve into solipsism or subjectivism for the very reason that ideas are first God’s and then humans’. Ideas are God’s gift to us: by granting that his ideas be made public, he gives them to us to be thought. If we ourselves are God’s ideas made public by his active power, how much more are our ideas derivative of and dependent on his power? The world of things is nothing more than God extending out the richness of his thoughts in such a way that these thoughts receive the joy of knowledge and thinking themselves, further contemplating the riches of God’s thought, of which  they are a miniscule part.

For Berkeley, the best way to describe this “making public” of God’s ideas is language.27 In his day, theories of human vision had thus far relied on the supposition that vision relied on the principles of geometry, yet this explanation failed to explain numerous conundrums. Setting himself to resolve these very problems in his early essay, A New Theory of Vision, Berkeley argued that vision did not employ the principles of geometry but functioned on a linguistic basis. Berkeley argued that fundamentally, language could be a described as a system of arbitrary signs, where the connection between the sign and the thing signified was entirely contingent. “C-a-t,” for example, could as readily signify a dog or rock as a cat. Berkeley’s insight was that vision relies, like human language, on a system of arbitrary signs, which we interpret as expectations serving the primary sense, that of touch (NTV §64). He argues that faintness, for example, may signify a near or far object, corresponding to the tactile experience or otherwise co-existing experience of great or less magnitude: thus, this sign, faintness, is arbitrarily connected to that which it signifies, great or less magnitude at a certain distance (NTV, §§71-73). This basic insight is developed in different ways in his later works, such as A Treatise Concerning The Principles of Human Knowledge, the Three Dialogues, Alciphron, and The Visual Language. In the first two works, Berkeley argues against metaphysical matter; in its place, he argues that ideas and souls are the only ontological realities necessary to explain the world of our experience. In the first edition of The Principles, he will call scientists “grammarians,” discerning the grammar of nature’s discourse (§108); at the end of his career, he echoes the same idea in Siris,

There is a certain analogy, constancy, and uniformity in the phaenomena or appearances of nature, which are a foundation for general rules: and these are a grammar for the understanding of nature, or that series of effects in the visible world, whereby we are enabled to foresee what will come to pass, in the natural course of things. (§252)

As the natural connexion of signs with the things signified is regular and constant, it forms a sort of rational discourse, and is therefore the immediate effect of an intelligent cause. (§254)

Therefore, the phaenomena of nature, which strike on the sense and are understood by the mind, do form not only a magnificent spectacle, but also a most coherent, entertaining, and instructive discourse; and to effect this, they are conducted, adjusted, and ranged by the greatest wisdom. (§122)

Berkeley intimates that ideas are communicated not from an inert and featureless thing-out-there to souls but between souls, between God and perceiving beings. To be is to be perceived or to be perceiving, was his claim (Philosophical Commentaries, §429). The connection between these works and his early essay on Vision is largely implicit but significant: if visual perception can be explained as language, could not language be the explanation between our ideas and their divine cause?28 The world is thus a linguistic structure communicated to us by God.29

In his latter works on vision, the essay The Visual Language and the apologetical dialogue, Alciphron, Berkeley turns this insight about the structuring of reality into an argument for the existence of God. Making the same point as in New Theory Vision, that faintness is an arbitrary sign, (Alci 4.8-9), Berkeley has the character Euphranor argue that sight uses a system of arbitrary signs as human language does (Alci 4.10, cf. Visual Language). After teasing this out at length, Euphranor connects this to the existence of God: humans would believe God if they heard him speak from heaven, but they ignore this visual language that they employ every day (Alci 4.15). Of this ignorance, he claims that it “seems to require intense thought to be able to unravel a prejudice that has been so long forming” (Alci 4.15).30

Idealism, for Berkeley, is not a theoretical foundation for our perception but a meaningful metaphysical claim concerning God’s imminent activity in the structure of nature and our perception of the world. The world of our experience is not a clock God wound up and let run, nor is it a carefully structured set of rules within which God occasionally interjects, but it is a discourse that he does not cease to speak—“in him we live and move and have our being,” and “he upholds the universe by the word of his power” (Acts 17:28; Heb 1:3 ESV). With Plato, Aristotle, and the early Christians, Berkeley is firmly set against mechanism: he is also firmly set against materialism, relativism, and scepticism. However, unlike Lloyd Gerson’s “Ur-Platonism,” the commonality shared by Plato, Aristotle, and their heirs, Berkeley was not an antinominalist.31) However, this was one point of difference was not small: by rejecting realism concerning universals and accepting particularism, Berkeley embraced a whole set of values undergirding modern philosophy. He was, thus, as undeniably modern as he was ancient, too theistic to be modern, yet too modern to be a Platonist. Perhaps this via media offers a viable alternative to the anti-modernism exhibited by many Christian theologians.

III. A Berkeleyan Rapprochement between Christianity and Modernity’s Children

We are told that Modernity results in problematic theological conclusions, of a God who lacks mystery and transcendence, yet who is simultaneously shut out of this world, often via a dichotomy of grace and nature or the natural and supernatural. However, Berkeley’s modernism does not yield such problems—though it certainly confronts theological paradigms built on Platonic foundations. Berkeley does not fit comfortably within premodernity nor Modernity. He seems to sit somewhere else entirely. His is a world infused with the presence and power of God, yet it is also a world that can be meaningfully engaged in a scientific manner, where particular things are all that matter—it is also a world where we can never escape language and where subject and object cannot be discretely separated. He embraces language and subjectivity without eschewing metanarratives.

To our contemporary, secular society, Berkeley would say that we do not need to reject particularism and empiricism—to reject science and subjectivity—to re-enchant our world. Instead, we need to press further into these very realities: it is in the very particularity of this world, its contingent things and events, that we encounter the living God who weaves together each person into a narrative of cosmic proportions, centred on His son. God is not found at the other end of abstraction or rational deduction, but we encounter him in the immediate phenomena of our experience, a kaleidoscope of sensation emerging as we listen to God speak. We also encounter him as we dig beneath the layers of these phenomena to the syntax, grammar, and morphology governing this communication. Like language, the world as analysed by science yields a structured ontology, as Michael Polanyi describes it, where each level of reality contains its own set of rules and cannot be explained by the next level, which nevertheless relies on each lower level:

The voice you produce is shaped into words by a vocabulary; a given vocabulary is shaped into sentences in accordance with grammar; and the sentences can be made to fit into a style, which in its turn is made to convey the ideas of a literary composition. Thus each level is subject to dual control; first, by the laws that apply to its elements in themselves and, second, by the laws that control the comprehensive entity formed by them.

We may conclude then quite generally—in confirmation of what I said when I identified the two terms of tacit knowing with two levels of reality—that it is impossible to represent the organizing principles of a higher level by the laws governing its isolated particulars.32)

Digging deeper into the discourse that is the created world yields greater knowledge of God and the world he has created.

Perhaps the greatest irony here is that William of Ockham’s own account of conceptualism and particularism bears striking resemblance to George Berkeley several centuries later, and both of their philosophies echo the Neo-Chalcedonian development of Chalcedonian Christology.26 The man whom contemporary theologians heap with scorn for disenchanting the world is the conceptual predecessor for a thoroughly Christian modernism that maintains the greatest insights of recent philosophical thought in a marriage with the early Christian Platonism, incorporating the philosophical developments early Christians found necessary to maintain an orthodox account of the incarnation.

  1. Hans Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to Mystery (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); Hans Boersma, Heavenly Participation: The Weaving of a Sacramental Tapestry (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2011). []
  2. Adrian Pabst, Metaphysics: The Creation of Hierarchy, Interventions (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2012), 290–91, 445. []
  3. John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (John Wiley & Sons, 2008), 14. []
  4. John Milbank, Beyond Secular Order: The Representation of Being and the Representation of the People (Hoboken, NY: John Wiley & Sons Inc, 2014), 49–113. []
  5. Milbank, Beyond Secular Order, 6–7. []
  6. Pabst, Metaphysics, 385. []
  7. Pabst, Metaphysics, 445. []
  8. Boersma, Heavenly Participation; Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology. []
  9. Milbank, Beyond Secular Order, 29–35. []
  10. Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology. []
  11. Boersma, Nouvelle Théologie and Sacramental Ontology; Boersma, Heavenly Participation; John Milbank, Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon, Radical Orthodoxy Series (London ; New York: Routledge, 2003). []
  12. M. B. Foster, “The Christian Doctrine of Creation and the Rise of Modern Natural Science,” Mind 43.172 (1934): 446–68; M.B. Foster, “Christian Theology and Modern Science of Nature (Part 1),” Mind 44 (1935): 439–66; M.B. Foster, “Christian Theology and Modern Science of Nature (Part 2),” Mind 45 (1936): 1–27; Johannes Zachhuber, The Rise of Christian Theology and the End of Ancient Metaphysics: Patristic Philosophy from the Cappadocian Fathers to John of Damascus (Oxford University Press, 2020). []
  13. E.g. Kathleen Callow, Man and Message: A Guide to Meaning-Based Text Analysis (Lanham, Md: Summer Institute of Linguistics, University Press of America, 1998). []
  14. Foster, “The Christian Doctrine of Creation and the Rise of Modern Natural Science.” []
  15. Ronald H. Nash, The Concept of God, Contemporary Evangelical Perspectives (Grand Rapids, Mich: Zondervan Pub. House, 1983); John M. Frame, The Doctrine of God, A Theology of Lordship (Phillipsburg: P&R Publishing, 2002); John Peckham, Divine Attributes: Knowing the Covenantal God of Scripture, 2021. []
  16. Edward Epsen, From Laws to Liturgy: An Idealist Theology of Creation (Brill, 2020), 6, 20. []
  17. See, for example, Peter Walmsley, The Rhetoric of Berkeley’s Philosophy (Cambridge; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1990), 141–81. []
  18. Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, Introduction §15. []
  19. Plato, The Republic, 509-511e. []
  20. All references to Siris are taken from the 2nd edition, George Berkeley, Siris, a Chain of Philosophical Reflexions and Inquiries Concerning the Virtues of Tar Water : And Divers Other Subjects Connected Together and Arising One from Another, 2nd Edition. (Dublin printed, London re-printed, for W. Innys, and C. Hitch, in Pater-noster-row ; and C. Davis in Holbourn, 1744). []
  21. Siris §§141, 295, 303, 330-331 []
  22. Siris §239. []
  23. In Siris, he argues on numerous occasions that a sort of Panentheism which accepts that God and the World are one, yet distinguishes the intellect or mind that orders and directs this one—on analogy with an animal and its active soul—is not atheism; however, he prefers to maintain a more traditionally Christian doctrine of God. E.g. §287-288 []
  24. Epsen, From Laws to Liturgy. []
  25. Timur Shchukin, “Matter as a Universal: John Philoponus and Maximus the Confessor on the Eternity of the World,” Scrinium 13.1 (2017): 361–82, https://doi.org/10.1163/18177565-00131p23. []
  26. Cf. Zachhuber, The Rise of Christian Theology and the End of Ancient Metaphysics. [] []
  27. James S Spiegel, “The Theological Orthodoxy of Berkeley’s Immaterialism,” Faith and Philosophy 13.2 (1996): 216–35. []
  28. In PHK, he explains that he had already arrived at his immaterialism when he wrote NTV, but was reticent to play all his cards at that time. PHK §§42-44. []
  29. Kenneth L. Pearce, Language and the Structure of Berkeley’s World (Oxford University Press, 2017). []
  30. In George Berkeley, Works on Vision, ed. Colin Murray Turbayne, The Library of Liberal Arts (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), 115–16. []
  31. Lloyd P. Gerson, From Plato to Platonism (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014). []
  32. Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 36. Cf. Andrew W Steiger, “A Critical Exploration and Theological Critique of Michael Polanyi’s Structured Ontology” (University of Aberdeen, Ph.D., 2021). []